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Editorial

ONE benefit of closer relations between Anglicans and Presbyterians would be in the field of theological thought. Presbyterians, especially in Scotland, treat the study of theology with a seriousness by which Anglicans, when they encounter it, often feel put to shame, and which may even be excessive. As it is, the works of their divines are widely and gratefully read among us. This is notably the case with the works of Dr John Baillie and of his brother, Dr Donald Baillie. We are happy to recall that, when Dr Donald Baillie's book, *God was in Christ*, was published in 1948, we offered it an enthusiastic welcome[1] and asked for more. His death in 1954 set a limit to what we might hope for, but fortunately he left MSS in a publishable condition. A volume of his sermons appeared in 1955,[2] and now a book on the sacraments[3] has been published which has the same quality as *God was in Christ*. It is prefixed by a beautifully written memoir by Dr John Baillie that reveals the background from which many Scottish theologians derive their peculiar strength.

The five lectures on the sacraments, which the book contains, are marked by a clarity, indeed by a simplicity, which may conceal their depth. They are also marked by a singular catholicity. If they are at all representative of current Presbyterian teaching about baptism and the eucharist and the whole *raison d'être* of sacraments in Christian faith and practice, the way should be wide open in this respect to closer Anglican-Presbyterian relations. *The Theology of the Sacraments* can be recommended to anyone who wants a sound introduction to sacramental theology or who wants to refresh and enlarge his thinking on the subject. The book also contains two other lectures, "Philosophers and Theologians on the Freedom of the Will", and "The Preaching of Christian Doctrine": the latter is packed with wise counsel about the preacher's task.

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Readers of THEOLOGY will be interested to hear about an international congress on "The Four Gospels in 1957" which is to be held at Oxford from 16 to 20 September. It will deal with all matters bearing on the interpretation and significance of the Gospels and

[1] See THEOLOGY, May 1948, pp. 161 f.
[2] *To Whom shall we go?* See THEOLOGY, September 1955, p. 362.
[3] *The Theology of the Sacraments and other papers.* Faber and Faber, 16s.

their place in the life of the Church. Many distinguished clergy and scholars from Great Britain and abroad will be taking part, and it is expected that there will be a large attendance at the congress. Further information can be obtained from Dr F. L. Cross, Christ Church, Oxford, if a stamped and addressed envelope is enclosed.

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We had occasion last year to mention the need that exists in the Church of England for good text-books on Christian ethics. We believe that this need will have to be met by native products, but meanwhile those who are concerned with teaching the subject may be glad to have their attention called to books that are produced elsewhere. We have lately received two that have been produced in th U.S.A., one of which has already been published in England. *Principles of Conduct*[1] by Professor John Murray of Westminster Theological Seminary, Philadelphia, is a systematic introduction to "Biblical Ethics" from a conservative evangelical point of view. Though few readers of THEOLOGY will be able to accept its presuppositions, e.g. with regard to the historical character of the opening chapters of Genesis, it is not uninstructive to see how the subject can be handled along traditional Protestant lines. *Christian Ethics*[2] by Professor Georgia Harkness is much more the kind of book we are looking for. Part I deals with "Foundations" and Part II with "Problems" of personal and social conduct in the light of our Lord's moral teaching. The author is a Methodist, and this circumstance occasionally colours the discussion as in the case of drinking alcoholic beverages. But the book is broadly conceived, and is based on wide learning that is communicated with lightness of touch though, as is proper, with a thoroughly American touch. It will at least get students to ask the right questions.

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The last issue of *The Modern Churchman*[3] to be edited by Dr H. D. A. Major is devoted to "a biographical record of the Modern Churchmen's Union 1898–1957". It is of much historical interest because it is largely taken up with a reprint (from earlier issues) of brief memoirs of Anglican churchmen many of whom are little more than names to the present generation but who ought to be more than that. Dr Major himself, still happily with us, has been a formidable, if slighty monotonous, controversialist, but behind the fierce front he has shown to the ecclesiastical world there has always been a disarmingly gentle and lovable personality.

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[1] Tyndale Press, 15s.
[2] Abingdon Press, $3.75.
[3] Vol. XLVI, Nos 3 and 4. Blackwell, 8s. 6d.

Ecumenical Unbelievers

INFIDELITY and scepticism probably always seem new and exciting and up to date. But unbelief is of course in fact as old, or very nearly, as the hills. The Psalmist refers to those who deny God. Lucretius was only one of many in the classical world who regarded religion as the source of much evil. And since then Europe has hardly ever been without influential and serious-minded unbelievers. In India, a by no means negligible strain in Hindu thought has through the centuries been explicitly atheistic. While in China much of the Communist attack on religion to-day merely repeats, in rather different terms, criticisms made by Confucian scholars of Buddhist faith ever since the ninth century.

It is, however, only in modern times that unbelief has become an organized and positive and self-conscious movement. And, as is the way of our world, its devotees in many countries have come together: in 1952 there was formed in Amsterdam the International Humanist and Ethical Union, which in July 1957 is holding its second World Congress.

Organized infidelity is represented in different countries by various bodies, some more long-established than others. In Britain, Robert Owen, the well-known manufacturer and social reformer, who died in 1858, held that all the religions of the world are false, and founded an ethical movement which he called Rational Religion—this at one time had as many as a hundred thousand members, but has long died out. The National Secular Society, however, is still active: it was founded by Charles Bradlaugh and Austin Holyoake in 1866: G. J. Holyoake had in the previous fifteen years founded a number of secular societies which claimed, while rejecting religion, to uphold humanitarian feeling and endeavour. The N.S.S. has been described as the Salvation Army of the humanist movement: it is essentially a militant movement: within the humanist movement, it is its special contribution to advocate an uncompromising philosophy of materialism and atheism: it is only by militant attack that Christianity can successfully be countered: it takes its freethinking ideas direct to the people through open-air and indoor meetings, and through its weekly paper *The Freethinker*: its basis is anti-clericalism. It regards the Ethical Union and the R.P.A. as having substituted an oblique approach and indirect attack for the more direct and hard-hitting technique formerly used: it itself continues with the direct attack.[1] It was, incidentally, only in 1869 that the name "Agnostic" was coined (by T. H. Huxley).

M. D. Conway became minister of the South Place Unitarian chapel, and gradually transformed this into a purely humanist body: here about 1869 theistic dogma was definitely abandoned, while moral idealism was retained: and prayer in the Sunday meetings was replaced, it is said, by deeply earnest spoken statements of faith in ethical purposes and in the moral forces inherent in man. A London (now the West London) Ethical Society was founded in 1886, and

[1] F. A. R. in *The Freethinker*, 14 December 1956.

included among its members such well-known people as Bernard Bosanquet, Edward Caird, J. Seeley, Leslie Stephen, and Henry Sidgwick. In 1888 Stanton Coit, who like M. D. Conway was an American, became minister of South Place, and its name was changed from the South Place Religious Society to the South Place Ethical Society. Towards the close of the century, Stanton Coit organized in England a number of Ethical Societies. The (British) Ethical Union now comprises five substantial societies (of which the largest is South Place), with memberships varying from one to five hundred persons, all but one of the five in London, and four smaller groups; this contrasts with fifty groups earlier in the century.

The Rationalist Press Association was formed in 1899: its Honorary Associates have included J. B. Bury, Einstein, Freud, Lord Horder, Professor Julian Huxley, Mr Somerset Maugham, Sir John Boyd Orr, and Mr Bertrand Russell, who is now its President, among many other distinguished persons. It now has about five thousand members and subscribers. The Progressive League, which was established in the early 1930s by H. G. Wells, C. E. M. Joad, and others, is affiliated to the Ethical Union: its main concern is with personal freedom and cultural interests. These bodies hold both annual conferences and regular weekly meetings, usually on Sundays, but also on weekdays. The R.P.A., the National Secular Society, the South Place Ethical Society, the Ethical Union, and the Positivist Committee are represented on a recently formed body called the Humanist Council.

In view of the American origin of such early leaders of organized English humanism as M. D. Conway and Stanton Coit, it is not surprising that in the U.S.A. also the middle of the last century should have seen the start of an organized movement of unbelievers. Its founder was Felix Adler, who had been trained as a rabbi, but reacted from his inherited Judaism, declared himself a rationalist, and in 1876 founded the New York Society for Ethical Culture: his motto was "Deed not Creed": from this there developed a fairly widespread Ethical Culture movement in the U.S.A., now represented by the American Ethical Union (established in 1889). There is also a more recently founded American Humanist Association. A number of Unitarian churches in the U.S.A. are claimed to be really humanist. The Ethical Union now has about 5,500 members, with twenty-three local groups and socieites. The Humanist Association has about fifty local groups, chapters, and affiliates, which meet for philosophical study. This body had two observers at the Evanston meeting of the Word Council of Churches: the proceedings there, and the great hopes entertained, suggested to them a conference of thirteenth-century alchemists.

The Positivist form of unbelief originated in France with Auguste Comte in 1830: this involved the rejection of anything regarded as theistic or supernatural. Comte later developed this into what he called the Religion of Humanity, in which the idea of Humanity virtually took the place of a personal God as the object of worship: Comte declared himself to be the High Priest of the new cult, and worked out a somewhat fantastic cultus with a strange list of his-

torical figures who were to be revered in effect as saints. Frederic Harrison preached this humanist religion in London for many years, and others have done so in France, but it has never had many followers. Such thinkers as the atheist existentialists, Sartre and Camus, in effect present a new form of humanism. A French Humanist Federation was established in 1954: the I.H.E.U. has friendly, though informal, relations with this, and also with the Union of Free Religious Communities in Germany (established in 1859).

The Belgian Humanist League has about a thousand members: it has regular meetings devoted to reflection, debating, and study, and a periodical called *Diogenes*. It has assumed responsibility in the Flemish part of Belgium for moral education in the schools at all levels of those who do not belong to any religious organization.

In the Netherlands there had for years been small groups of humanists, but it was only during the second World War that the idea of a broad humanist movement as a worthy counterpart of the Churches developed. In November 1945 "Humanitas" was founded as an association for social work on a humanist basis, and in February 1946 the Humanist League, which now has about nine thousand members. There are also several other more or less independent humanist bodies, for instance the Students' Association on a Humanist Basis (founded in 1947), which has five hundred members. Dutch humanists do organized hospital visiting, give spiritual care to the unemployed in labour camps, and to prisons: officers of the Humanist Homefront do social and spiritual work among the armed forces. Organized humanism is concerned for care of orphans, marriage guidance, and housing of old people. A number of cities subsidize this work of "Humanitas", though some refuse to do so. There are said now to be about fifteen thousand avowed adherents of organized humanism in the Netherlands.

A Humanist Ethical League has recently been established in Norway. And some who have such a standpoint have there been promoting a movement for civic confirmation, in opposition to Church confirmation. There are organized humanist groups also in Germany, Austria, and probably other European countries also.

Humanist secularism is increasingly strong in India: its adherents usually do not deny that they are Hindus, and are quite willing, in the traditional spirit of Hindu tolerance, to accept and practise Hindu religious rites without necessarily having any belief in them: indeed, if Hinduism is attacked, they come quickly to its defence. There is an Indian Rationalist Association mainly under the inspiration of the late M. N. Roy, a Marxist and former Communist. Roy's writings (for example, his *New Humanism*) claim to provide a revolutionary humanist answer to the challenge of Communism. The Indian movement's chief journals are *The Radical Humanist* and *The Indian Rationalist.*

There are smaller Humanist movements also elsewhere, as in Nigeria, Japan, and Johannesburg, some at least of which it is expected will be represented at the I.H.E.U. congress.

The present International Humanist and Ethical Union is not the

first coming together on an international scale of people who may in general be called rationalists or unbelievers or humanists. As long ago as 1896 an International Ethical Union was founded in Zürich: ten years later, what is described as the second International Ethical Conference met at Eisenach and drew up a constitution. The present I.H.E.U., however, is perhaps more securely based than the earlier organization was.

The National Secular Society, though it belongs to the British Humanist Council, does not belong to the I.H.E.U., but to an older body, the World Union of Freethinkers. This mirrors the general outlook of the N.S.S., and is avowedly opposed to religion in any form, equating this with supernaturalism, while the I.H.E.U. tends to place itself within the tradition of religion. The British Ethical Union belonged to the W.U.F. before the war, and it then had affiliated bodies also in the Soviet Union and Czechoslovakia. The W.U.F. holds its own international conferences, sometimes just at the same time as the I.H.E.U. It is, however, much more well disposed to the I.H.E.U. than is the International Council of Christian Churches, which in some ways its resembles, to the World Council of Churches.

The views of secular humanists differ very widely: and indeed it is very commonly laid down by the groups with which we are concerned that membership involves neither acceptance nor rejection of belief, for instance, in the existence of God or in immortality. Some groups of humanistic unbelievers are explicitly opposed to religion, others claim that they profess a form of religion, though of a rational nature. Some would distinguish humanism, as retaining religion, from secularism, which altogether rejects it. All, however, would claim to be opposed to "supernatural religion", to any belief in a Providence or Divine Grace which can help man, and to what they conceive theology to be.

At least in the English-speaking countries, humanist unbelievers have regular Sunday meetings at about the time of church services. The West London Society was in 1914 renamed the Ethical Church, under the influence of Stanton Coit, and for forty years in a chapel in Bayswater it had a form of service modelled on the Book of Common Prayer, with, it is said, the theology left out: the creeds and liturgy were reinterpreted in ethical and psychological terms. Stanton Coit thought that the modernists in the Church of England could give a lead to a religious humanism, and that his Ethical Church could be a pilot model to show the way. This expectation, however, it is admitted, was disappointed. In 1954 the chapel was sold to the Roman Catholics, the name Ethical Church was replaced by the original name, West London Ethical Society, and a house in Kensington became the centre: this marked the end of the experiment with Anglican ways of worship.

The Sunday meeting now usually consists of some readings (for example, from such a writer as Gilbert Murray) and music, followed by an address and a short discussion. There can hardly be a place for prayer, though some groups have a period for corporate meditation. Some groups, but probably not many, have congregational singing

(South Place has one hymn at each Sunday morning meeting) and responsive reading. An Ethical Declaration may be read. South Place till seventy years ago had a resident minister: since then it has had instead a panel of three Sunday lecturers. Marriage and funeral ceremonies, and even "naming" ceremonies, are conducted by leaders of humanist groups, like ordained ministers, for their adherents: there are of course no supernatural references: rather, moral values are celebrated—respect for these is expressed, and dedication to their fulfilment in personal and social life. In England the Ethical Societies usually have parity of official status with religious denominations, and are recognized by the Registrar-General as places where marriages can be performed. At least some American rationalists insist that their Sunday morning gathering is a "service" and not merely a lecture: and there is increasing stress that Ethical thought is no mere philosophy as opposed to being "religious".

Though humanists and Marxist Communists are at one in their unbelief—and, indeed, Marxist Communism is itself an extreme form of secular humanism—Western humanists are for the most part as much opposed to Communism as they are to Christianity. So Mrs Margaret Knight claims that scientific humanism is opposed to both the two great rival dogmatic systems, Christianity and Communism: to try to combat Communism by reviving Christianity is like trying to combat a belief in flying saucers by reviving the belief in witches riding on broomsticks. Unbelief on the other side of the Iron Curtain is not represented in the I.H.E.U., nor has any attempt been made to make contact with it, or secure its support for the forthcoming congress. This is an interesting contrast to the unceasing attempt to get Christians in the Communist part of the world into the World Council of Churches. A few British Communists or Communist sympathizers are members of the R.P.A., and the N.S.S. perhaps includes some. But in general the Free Thought revolution is not felt by British humanists to have extended as yet to the Communist countries. Marxist Communism does not really put science in place of religion, but casts out devils by calling on Beelzebub. The Executive Director of the American Humanist Association writes that to become true scientific humanists Communists would have to give up belief in the absolute truth of the gospel as revealed by Marx-Engels-Stalin, and also the individual man, rather than revealed "truth" or organizational advantage, would have to become the measure of ethics.[1]. An English secularist,[2] in answer to his inquiries, was told by his contacts in East Germany, Bulgaria, and Hungary that Free Thought there is unnecessary, since they are governed from a dialectical-materialist and therefore atheist standpoint.

Humanists are far too level-headed to regard all views as equally true and valuable, and they are accordingly out to propagate their own views and to convert others, not least Christians, to them, in spite of the occasional use of phrases such as co-operating with the

[1] I.H.E.U. Information Bulletin, No. 5, January 1955. Much of the material used in this article comes from the I.H.E.U. bulletins.

[2] D. Shipper in *The Freethinker*, 14 December 1956.

Churches. According to Mr Blackham,[1] the humanist movement has a mission to create humanist lives and a humanist world. Accordingly, they subscribe for the propagation of their opinions. They are not satisfied to be just a tolerated minority;[2] they work for the day when all men will be humanist infidels. The objects of the South Place Ethical Society include not only the study, but also the dissemination, of ethical principles. Mrs Knight goes so far as to describe Christians as her adversaries, and it has been pointed out that her standpoint is very different from that of agnosticism which would not wish to launch a crusade against Christian faith, as in effect Mrs Knight does. Programs of expansion have been adopted in several countries.

Unbelievers naturally seek as many opportunities as possible of propagating their unbelief on the wireless, and do this in most countries in varying measure. English unbelievers urge that the B.B.C. should allow more controversy with regard to religious belief, and should not be guided solely by the admittedly small number of professed adherents of organized humanism. A well-attended meeting, arranged by the Humanist Council, was held last October in the Caxton Hall, under the patronage of Professor J. Bronowski, Professor Gilbert Murray, Mr J. B. Priestley, and Mr Bertrand Russell, calling for "Freedom on the Air". They also hold that there should be recognition, such as there is not at present, of non-Christian viewpoints in State schools, presumably meaning instruction in humanism for children whose parents prefer this as an alternative to Christianity.

In England, at all events, humanists are a good deal concerned over the great preponderance of elderly people in the movement and its seeming lack of appeal to youth: and Mr Blackham admits that humanism is in the dock nowadays.[3] It is for this reason not surprising that unbelieving humanists should be increasingly concerned to unite all who share their views. A committee has proposed the merging of the Ethical Union and the R.P.A., and these two bodies have set up a Joint Development Committee.

Complacent ecclesiastics are too apt to dismiss secular humanism with the comment that there is nothing new in it. Very largely this is true. And yet a technological world could predispose very many people in all countries in its favour. Christians, moreover, are hardly the people to dismiss a belief simply on the ground that it is not new: if modern secular humanism adds little to Celsus and T. H. Huxley, what do we add to Christ and the New Testament? It would be foolish to assume that unbelieving humanism will always remain in a trough, even if it is there at the moment. It can, as the Bishop of Southwell and Dr J. H. Oldham have said, hardly be denied that humanism, as a general outlook rather than as organized movement, is the religion of half the intelligent persons in the modern world.

Moreover, humanists are at least, according to their lights, con-

[1] *Essentials of Humanism*, p. 20.
[2] H. J. Blackham, *The Human Tradition*, pp. 170 and 211.
[3] *Essentials of Humanism*, p. 2.

cerned for truth and goodness, and this is better than either to ignore them or to profess an insincere interest in them. If the Church were in practice more what she should be, the appeal of secular humanism would be much less than it is. And if the Church stresses too one-sidedly either, for example, the total corruption of human nature or the reality of the next world at the expense of this world, a humanist reaction is a natural consequence. Humanist ideas are to a large extent derived from Christianity but distorted. Certainly the Church should not denounce indiscriminately unbelieving humanism, but should realize that God may be at work in it, as in the Eastern non-Christian religions, and indeed that Christians may have something to learn from it. The two faiths are by no means in direct and total contradiction; and a humanist writer, Mr Archibald Robertson, has acclaimed[1] as a flash of pure humanism the statement in 1 John 4. 20, "He that loves not his brother, whom he has seen, cannot love God, whom he has not seen." It is good that leading Christian and humanist thinkers should be having conversations on the general problem of religion and morals in our divided society. And Christians may well take an interest in the forthcoming International Humanist and Ethical Congress.

G. Francis S. Gray.

The English Usage of Eucharistic Consecration 1548-1662—I

In his recent informative account of the Proposed Indian Liturgy, Mr James Stuart suggests that the form given to the epiclesis in the revision of 1955 is intended to possess "a consecratory significance", and continues, "If this is really so, it involves an abandonment of the traditional Anglican connexion of the moment of consecration with the Words of Institution".[2] Commenting on Mr Stuart's statement in a letter to the editor of Theology, Mr A. M. Allchin supposes it to be "highly doubtful whether there is any one traditional Anglican view about the moment of consecration"; then, turning to Wheatly, he proceeds, "The Western view has been predominant during the last century, but I suspect that the majority of seventeenth- and eighteenth-century Anglicans would have agreed with Wheatley's [*sic*] opinion", and would have regarded the clause, "Hear us, O merciful Father, we most humbly beseech thee; and grant that we receiving", etc., as "the consecratory section of the 1662 rite".[3] Something more than doubt and suspicion are required in these matters,

[1] *Reason in Action* (Ed. H. Hawton), p. 38.
[2] "A Letter from North India", Theology, October 1956, pp. 404–8
[3] Theology, December 1956, p. 508. The reference is to Wheatly, *Rational Illustration of the Book of Common Prayer*, 3rd ed., 1720, p. 290.

however; evidence relating to them is not wanting, and the reference to Wheatly should have brought at least Waterland to mind. Further, Mr Allchin appears to imply that the connexion of the moment of consecration with the Words of Institution was not "predominant" until the nineteenth century. What then, we may ask, of that rubric in the Communion Service which prescribes procedure for an additional consecration? Mr Allchin ignores it. Wheatly, on the other hand, notices and discusses it in the previous part of the paragraph to which Mr Allchin refers. In this rubric, Wheatly observes, "the Church seems to suppose that the Consecration is made by the *Words of Institution*".[1] The rubric, he comments, "was added in the last Review (i.e. in 1661): but to what end, unless to save the minister some time, does not appear. But what is very remarkable is, that it was taken from the *Scotch* Liturgy, which expressly calls the words of Institution *the words of Consecration*;[2] though the compilers of it had restored the sentence that had been thrown out of King Edward's second Common Prayer,[3] imagining, one would think, that the Elements were not consecrated without them."[4] Wheatly admits himself perplexed by a rubric apparently at variance with ideas which, in his judgment, are incontrovertibly sound and self-evidently right. But Wheatly's knowledge of the historical background of the English Prayer Books is seen to be often limited. Apart from the Scottish Liturgy of 1637, he clearly knows nothing of the circumstances of the offending rubric, and makes no reference to the literature from which the circumstances could be ascertained. He omits even to notice that the rubric gives effect to the penultimate clause of Canon XXI of 1603. To recall the principal facts of the early Anglican history of the usage which the rubric enjoins is the purpose of this article.

It will be convenient to take for starting point the first vernacular liturgical formulary of the reign of Edward VI. *The Order of the Communion,* issued in 1548, restored the ancient usage of delivering the communion to the laity under both kinds. Two rubrics in the *Order* are worthy of attention. The first treats of the preparation of the elements: "as heretofore usually the priest hath doen with the Sacrament of the body, to prepare, blisse and consecrate so muche as will serue the people: so it shall contynue still after the same maner and fourme, saue that he shal blesse and consecrate the biggest Chalice or soome faire and conuenient Cup or Cuppes full of wyne,

[1] Op. cit., p. 290; the italics are Wheatly's.

[2] Wheatly is quoting from the fifth concluding rubric of the Scottish Communion Service of 1637, ". . . if there be want, the words of consecration may be repeated again, over more, either Bread or Wine: the Presbyter beginning at these words in the Prayer of Consecration (Our Saviour, in the night that he was betrayed, took, etc.)".

[3] Wheatly is here referring to a characteristic of the Scottish Service of 1637, viz. the combination of the petition preceding the Institution Narrative in the English Communion Service of 1549 with the petition preceding the Narrative in the English Service of 1552. In the Scottish Service, the combined petition also precedes the Institution Narrative.

[4] Op. cit., p. 290.

with soome water put unto it."[1] The second prescribes the procedure to be followed, if "the wyne halowed and consecrate dooth not suffice or bee ynough" for the communicants: in such case the priest "may go again to ye aultare, and reuerenlie, and deuoutlie, prepare, and consecrate an other, and so the thirde, or more lykewise, begynning at the woordes, *Simili modo, postquam cenatum est*, and endying at these wordes, *qui pro uobis & pro multis effundetur in remissionem peccatorū*, and without any leuacion or lifting up."[2] The second rubric, it will be noticed, adapts the "Western" tradition to a new situation, and is no different in principle from that which now obtains; it is concerned only with the wine, because the quantity required for the communicants could not be as accurately gauged as could the number of "people's hosts" or wafers. The interest of the first rubric is of a different kind. It lies in the phrase, "bless and consecrate", having bread or wine as object. "Bless" (with "hallow" as an alternative, as in the second rubric) and "consecrate" are synonymous terms. To "bless" the elements is to "consecrate" them, and *vice versa*. Here again we meet with a Western tradition, and one often expounded by medieval commentators on the Canon of the Mass. John de Burgo, for instance, who was Chancellor of Cambridge in 1384, and whose work on the Sacraments, under the title *Pupilla Oculi*, was in such demand as to be printed several times in the early years of the sixteenth century, briefly refers to the tradition.[3] Commenting upon the phrase, "benedixit et fregit", in the liturgical Institution Narrative, he says, "A symbolic breaking should not be made in the host at this point, as some do, because Christ consecrated before he broke, although it may appear otherwise from the order of the words.[4] In fact, the meaning of the words is this: As he blessed, he consecrated."[5] Our Lord was understood by the medieval theologians to have consecrated the bread and wine before giving them to the disciples with those words which the same theologians agreed in regarding as "the form of the consecration". Some theologians, indeed, as we learn from Durandus of Mende, supposed that the Lord twice recited the words, "This is my body", "This is my blood", first when he "blessed" or consecrated the bread and the wine, and again when he distributed them. Durandus's own opinion, however, was generally preferred, "It can be reasonably stated that Christ, by a divine force hidden from us, first consecrated, and afterwards declared the form by which those after his time bless. For he blessed by his own force,

[1] *The Order of the Communion*. A facsimile of the British Museum copy c. 25, f. 15, ed. by H. A. Wilson, Henry Bradshaw Society, Vol. 34, 1908, p. 10 of the facsimile.

[2] Id., p. 19 of the facsimile.

[3] *Pupilla Oculi* was part of de Burgo's ample clerical handbook, *Oculus Sacerdotis*.

[4] I.e. the words, "This is my body", do not precede, but follow the blessing and breaking.

[5] "Non est hic faciendum signum fractionis in hostia, sicut quidam faciunt, quia Christus prius consecrauit quam fregit, quamuis aliter appareat ex serie uerborum. Sed re uera sensus uerborum talis est, Dum benedixit, consecrauit," *Pupilla Oculi*, Paris, 1510, fo. xxiii recto, R.

but we through the force which he imparted to the words."[1] When therefore the priest pronounced the words of institution as the form of consecration in the Canon, he "blessed" the elements, as Christ himself had blessed them; and when he broke the host after the Canon was ended and consecration effected, he was again following Christ's example. The relevance of this matter will appear at a later stage of this article.

Properly considered, the Anglican or reformed English tradition of worship begins in 1549 with the issue of the First Edwardine Prayer Book. In the Communion Service of that Book, the "minister" is directed to "take so muche Bread and Wine, as shall suffice for the persons appoynted to receive the holy Communion".[2] The exact number of communicants having been intimated to the curate previously, no need for additional consecration could be expected to arise, and no rubric concerning it was introduced. The First Communion Service was not committed by any rubric or other formula, as was the *Order* of 1548, to a statement of what was essential for consecration. The consecratory section itself, which forms the central part of the Canon of the Service, falls into three divisions: an Exordium, a Petition, and an Institution Narrative. The Exordium, which corresponds with no passage in the Latin Canon and is designed to preclude certain sacrificial interpretations of the eucharistic action, is substantially the same as the Exordium of the Consecration Prayer in the present Prayer Book; no further notice of it is required. The Petition and the Institution Narrative, on the other hand, demand some consideration.

The Petition is thus phrased, "Heare vs (O merciful father) we besech thee: and with thy holy spirite and worde, vouchsafe to bl+esse and sanc+tifie these thy gyftes, and creatures of bread and wyne, that they maie be vnto vs the bodye and bloude of thy moste derely beloued sonne Jesus Christe." That this Petition is related to the *Quam oblationem* clause of the Latin Canon is evident. Unlike the Latin, however, the English Petition makes the consecration of the elements the sole object of request. Further, it amplifies the request by specifying the divine word and the Spirit as the instruments of consecration. In so doing, the English Petition gives liturgical expression to a well-known Western doctrine which had descended to the sixteenth century from Paschasius Radbertus[3] by way of Gratian's *Decretum*,[4] and with which even English layfolk were

[1] "Sane dici potest, quod Christus virtute diuina nobis occulta primo confecit et postea formam expressit, sub qua posteri benedicunt. Ipse namque virtute propria benedixit, nos vero ex illa virtute quam indidit verbis," *Rationale Divinorum Officiorum* IV, xli, 15, Lyon, 1584, fo. 165 verso. See also the discussion by Gabriel Biel in his *Sacri Canonis Misse . . . expositio*, lectio xxxvi, Paris, 1516, fo. lxv verso.

[2] This and the other quotations from the First Edwardine Communion Service are taken from the reprint of the first issue of the Prayer Book of 1549 published by the De La More Press, 1903, under the editorship of Vernon Staley.

[3] E.g. "illius carnis sacramentum, quod per sacerdotem super altare in verbo Christi per Spiritum sanctum divinitus consecratur", "caro Christi et sanguis . . . non in merito consecrantis, sed in verbo efficitur Creatoris et in virtute

acquainted through the Corpus Christi sermon in John Mirk's *Festyuall*: the sermon refers to the sacrament as "goddes owne body in fourme of breed made by the uertue of crystes wordes that the preste sayth & by werkynge of ye holy gooste".[5]

The Institution Narrative, which immediately succeeds the Petition, is a new formula of German Lutheran inspiration, in which words and phrases from the Narratives of the New Testament are worked into a unity. It differs from the Narrative now in use in one particular: in 1549, the sentence following the words, "tooke breade", was phrased, "and when he had blessed, and geuen thankes". However little the Edwardine conservatives may have liked the new English formula, they could not object that it failed to satisfy the requirements of the Western tradition of consecration. The new Narrative contained "crystes wordes"; and if the phraseology of the Petition meant what it appeared to men, the Petition clearly indicated the intention with which the Narrative was to be recited, and so pointed forward to the Words of Institution as being the external means of effecting consecration, in the sense in which that term had been commonly understood. It should be remarked, however, that nowhere in the Communion Service of 1549 (or, for that matter, in the First Prayer Book as a whole) do the terms "consecrate", "consecration", appear. Cranmer, who undoubtedly was the compiler of the Service, seems sedulously to have avoided them.

In 1550, when the First Prayer Book had been in use for not much more than a year, Cranmer launched his attack on "the papistical doctrine of transubstantiation" in his treatise, *A Defence of the True and Catholick Doctrine of the Sacrament of the Body and Blood of our Saviour Christ*.[6] The purpose of the treatise, in its positive aspect, was to establish that the Words of Institution were "figurative speeches",[7] and that the consecrated bread and wine were signs or figures of Christ's Body and Blood. If, then, the effect of consecration was not to transubstantiate the elements, how was it to be described? And what precise meaning was to be attached to the term "consecration", if it were still used? "Consecration," Cranmer wrote, "is the separation of any thing from a profane and worldly use unto a spiritual and godly use. And therefore when usual and common water is taken from other uses, and put to the use of baptism, in the name of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Ghost, then it may rightly be called consecrated water, that is to say, water put to

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Spiritus sancti . . . in hoc mysterio credendum est, quod eadem virtute Spiritus sancti per verbum Christi caro ipsius efficiatur invisibili operatione", *Liber de Corpore et Sanguine Domini*, cc. IV (3), and XI (1) (Migne, *P. Latina* 120, 1279 B and 1310 C).

[4] See Pars III. De Consecratione Distinctio II, cfl lxxii. The passages of Paschasius herein contained, inclusive of XII (1), were incorporated in the Proper Office of Corpus Christi in the English Breviaries.

[5] *The festyuall*, London, 1508, fol. xlix verso. The popularity of this book is attested by the fact the *Short-Title Catalogue* notes nineteen issues between 1483 and 1532.

[6] See the reprint, with a Preface by Dean Wace, published by the Protestant Reformation Society, 1907.

[7] Reprint, pp. 136, 161.

an holy use. Even so when common bread and wine be taken and severed from other bread and wine, to the use of holy communion, that portion of bread and wine, although it be of the same substance that the other is from which it is severed, yet it is now called consecrated or holy bread and holy wine. . . . But specially they may be called holy and consecrated when they be separated to that holy use by Christ's own words, which he spake for that purpose, saying of the bread, *This is my body*; and of the wine, *This is my blood.* So that commonly the authors,[1] before those words be spoken, do take the bread and wine but as other bread and wine; but after those words be pronounced over them, then they take them for consecrated and holy bread and wine. Not that the bread and wine can be partakers of any holiness or godliness, or can be the body and blood of Christ; but that they represent the very body and blood of Christ, and the holy food and nourishment which we have by him. And so they be called by the names of the body and blood of Christ."[2] At a later stage of his treatise, in citing St John Damascene as a witness in favour of his opinion, Cranmer alleges that Damascene "meant not that the bread considered in itself, or the wine in itself being not received, is his (i.e. Christ's) flesh and blood; but to such as by unfeigned faith worthily receive the bread and wine, to such the bread and wine are called by Damascene the body and blood of Christ".[3] Cranmer's exposition lacks the lucidity of a Zwingli and the comprehensiveness of a Calvin; but against the general background of medieval theology his meaning is not in doubt. Cranmer treated the Eucharist as completely analogous with Baptism.[4] As the sacrament of Baptism is "perfected" or accomplished in washing with water[5] in representation of cleansing from sins, so the sacrament of the Eucharist is "perfected" or accomplished in the eating and drinking of bread and wine in representation of feeding upon Christ. Except in the process of eating and drinking, therefore, the bread and wine of the Communion are no more sacrament than the water in the baptismal font. The holy use to which each class of element is put makes it sacrament, and so "consecrates" it. What, then, is the function of the Words of Institution at the Communion? Taken in the context of the liturgical Institution Narrative, they denote the holy use to which the elements, set upon the communion table, are to be put by the communicants; and they declare the figurative meaning which Christ himself attached to the bread and wine, and which the

[1] I.e. the patristic writers, whom Cranmer claimed to have on his side in the controversy. [2] Op. cit., pp. 181 f. [3] Id., p. 196.

[4] For a fuller treatment of the parallel between Baptism and the Eucharist, see *Defence*, Bk. I, c. xii; op. cit., pp. 19 ff.

[5] John de Burgo sums up medieval teaching on the subject thus, "hoc sacramentum (i.e. of the Eucharist) perficitur in consecratione materie, sed non in usu. Alia vero sacramenta non in consecratione materie sed in usu perficiuntur; ut patet de baptismo et confirmatione et unctione, quae non perficiunter in benedictione aque et chrismatis, sed in ablutione et unctione cum determinatis verborum formis" (*Pupilla Oculi*, Paris, 1510, fo. xi verso, E). Cranmer applied the principle of Baptism to the Eucharist, and so reduced the two sacraments to a common pattern.

communicants are to recall as they eat and drink. Hence the Words are "consecratory" only in an entirely new sense of that term, if at all. They are not spoken to or for the bread and wine (after the erroneous belief and practice of "the papists"). They are spoken to or for the communicants, to confirm their faith that "Christ gave his body and shed his blood upon the cross for" them.[1] So spoken, the Words of Institution are a normal component of the rite of the Lord's Supper.

In the final stages of his treatise Cranmer suggests that the Communion Service of 1549 is "agreeable" with the institution and true meaning of the rite, as he has expounded them.[2] Notwithstanding, it could have been no less plain to the Edwardine reader, than it is to the modern, that in regard to consecration the two documents were not in harmony; and also that, if Cranmer's opinions were to prevail, liturgical adjustments would be required. When the Second Prayer Book appeared in 1552, it was found that the Communion Service had been submitted to a drastic revision which had rendered it agreeable with the *Defence*. After the Preface and Sanctus (now deprived of the pendant, "Blessed is he that cometh," etc.), there now came, not a prayer in the form of a Canon, but two prayers, first that of "Humble Access", and then a formula consisting of Exordium, Petition, and Institution Narrative. None of these remained as it had been in 1549. The change in the Exordium was slight, elucidating without altering the sense. The other changes were radical. By removal of the phrase, "in these holy Misteries", after the clause, "Graunt vs . . . so to eate the fleshe of thy dere sonne Jesus Christ, and to drynke his bloud", the Prayer of Humble Access was so altered as to elude associating the elements with the Body and Blood. The Petition, familiar from being still in use, was entirely new. Taken in its literal and grammatical sense, the Petition is not (as its predecessor was) a request for the consecration of the elements, but a prayer that to those receiving the bread and wine according to Christ's institution, in remembrance of his death, the reception might be the occasion of participating in his Body and Blood. The Institution Narrative was amended by excision of the words, "blessed and", so that any suggestion of Christ having consecrated the bread before giving it to the disciples was removed. The rubrics ordering the manual acts were also removed.[3] The Institution Narrative was followed immediately by the distribution of the bread and wine, without mention of the Body and Blood in the sentences of delivery. For the rest, it may be noticed that the use of the terms, "consecrate", "consecration", was again avoided; that there was no direction concerning either the quantity of the bread and wine to be taken, or the

[1] See *Defence*, Bk. I, cap. xvi; op. cit., p. 25. For a condemnation of the "artolatreia" of the Canon of 1549, and of the suggestion that something is done to the elements by consecration, see Bucer's *Censura* of the First Prayer Book in his *Scripta Anglicana*, Basel, 1577, pp. 468 ff.

[2] *Defence*, Bk. V, cap. xviii; op. cit., pp. 257 f.

[3] The Service of 1549 had contained directions for the celebrant to take the bread and the cup into his hands at the appropriate words of the Narrative.

moment at which they were to be set upon the Communion Table; that no instruction was given concerning the procedure to be followed when, the bread and wine having been consumed, more were required for distribution; and, finally, that if any bread or wine remained, the curate was to have it "to hys owne use". The character of the adjustments of 1552 was neatly described by a contemporary observer; the London Grey Friars chronicler, in his entry for November 1, wrote, "Item on Alhallon day began the book of the new servis of bred and wyne in Powlles . . ."[1] Cranmer may well have supposed that, with the Second Prayer Book, he had permanently banished from the Church of England not merely the term, but also the notion and usage of "consecration" in any interpretation of them approaching the traditional.[2]

E. C. Ratcliff.

(*To be concluded*)

Faith and Freedom

After a lively and informative survey of the recent course of philosophy and theology, especially as the author has witnessed it himself at Oxford, this book[3] enters on its central themes with an account of puzzles which call especially for philosophical treatment and of our knowledge of God's purpose in the world as the ultimate answer to them. The crucial chapter in the first of the two parts into which the book is divided is the one on revelation, and here Professor Hodgson seems to me to say a great deal that is true and timely, although he also appears to break off just when the main issue is about to be faced.

Professor Hodgson firmly rejects what he aptly describes as "the traditional two-source theory" of knowledge by which we have to think of "two fields of reality, assigning one to human discovery and the other to divine revelation". This is not to repudiate the notion of a unique divine revelation. Professor Hodgson is most emphatic on that point, but it does mean that reason has its part in our apprehension of divine truth. Revelation and reason are not alternatives appropriate to different fields of inquiry. They are correlative, "the divine and the human sides involved in all man's growth in knowledge" (p. 91).

The views rejected in this way include various forms of authoritarianism: for example, the biblical theology which searches for hidden meanings in Scripture in the way we decipher clues to a

[1] I.e. St Paul's Cathedral: see *Chronicle of the Grey Friars of London*, ed. by J. G. Nichols, Camden Society (1851), 1852, p. 76.

[2] It is relevant to note that there is no prayer, or even petition, for a sanctifying of the water in the Baptismal rite of 1552.

[3] *For Faith and Freedom*. Gifford Lectures in the University of Glasgow, Vol. I, by Leonard Hodgson. Basil Blackwell, 21s.

crossword puzzle, the exclusive concentration on the thought forms of various peoples and especially the Hebrews, and the concern with divinely authorized images as an ultimate criterion of religious truth. "The uniqueness of the biblical revelation is not to be found in the thought-forms, the imagery, or the language used by the writers. It lies in the uniqueness of its content, the uniqueness of the events to which it bears witness, and of their significance as seen by the eye of faith" (p. 85). The decisive words here are clearly "the eye of faith". For if there is a unique content to be apprehended and unique events to be discerned, how are they recognized? We seem again faced with a dilemma. Either the unique events are perceived in the way we normally learn about the world or there must be some criterion of them, or a distinctive way of knowing, which brings us perilously near the "two-source" theory again.

Professor Hodgson fully apprehends the perils which beset his course here. The main point he stresses as a way of avoiding them is that the "divine action", the earthly events in which God reveals himself, includes "his inspiring men to see the significance of events as revelatory" (p. 92). This must not be thought of, however, as "a revival of the religious genius view of the prophets which flourished in the liberal theology of fifty years ago" (p. 101). Or, if it is, it is "a revival with a difference" (p. 101) and presents us with "a new creature". And what we have now to ask is, what is this "new creature"? With this question we seem to be closing in on our quarry.

Now, up to this point, I, for one at least, find myself able to follow Professor Hodgson well and to agree with him. He seems certainly right in opposing Tillich, for example, when the latter holds that revelation "does not imply factual assertions". Taken literally this quotation from Tillich would mean that "it would make no difference to our Christian faith if Jesus Christ never actually lived on earth or was crucified" (p. 102), if the gospels were mere myth. Obviously the special claims which the Christian makes have reference to actual occurrences of some sort. But when we ask what these occurrences are and how they are known, when and how does the apprehension of historical facts become revelation, Professor Hodgson has two main views to offer, neither of which appears to be altogether satisfactory, and the relation between which in a final system is never quite effectively exhibited.

The first view arises directly from what has been said. The prophets and disciples "did not undertake the kind of investigation, argument and demonstration that we are accustomed to use in scientific research and philosophizing. What they had to say came to them by the exercise of a gift of insight, an illumination of the mind to see into the meaning of things" (p. 83). "Their vision approves itself as genuine insight, what they have seen is accepted as objective truth, by those who in reading what they have written have their eyes opened to see what they saw" (p. 100).

Here we are then: "flair", "gift", "insight", "illumination", a vision that approves itself as genuine insight. But does this happen immediately, is the vision self-authenticating for those who attain it,

is the "gift" or "flair" a peculiarly religious one, just as a person has or has not a taste for music? I know full well the temptation to give a bold affirmative answer here. For if we are not to hold that purely secular considerations can eventually be built up into a religious view, do we not have to fall back at some point on some peculiarly religious way of knowing, summoning to our aid perhaps the apparent finality of certain kindred intuitions in aesthetics or morals? And this is an especially alluring course when we wish to stress the uniqueness of revelation and the transcendence of its Author and Object. But, like Professor Hodgson, I am a little unhappy about this procedure. It savours a little of a last ditch desperation and does not seem to accord altogether with the complexity of religious experience, its availability to all and its close relation to the normal features of human life. As regards Professor Hodgson, he is in any case firmly committed to a rejection of any form of the "two-source" theory, and we are expressly warned not to ascribe to the Hebrew prophets, for example, "a mental endowment of a unique kind which invests with sacrosanctity their thought-forms, their imagery, or the words in which they express them" (p. 83).

If we were to take our last stand on "a gift" and "the inspiring of certain men to see", I think we would have, as philosophers, to say a great deal about it. Not that we can be expected in this case to provide some kind of independent justification, for *ex hypothesi* that is ruled out. But there are general difficulties attending the claim to immediate insight which need to be overcome and some peculiarities of its exercise in a particular field to be noted, as is done, for example, in the parallel controversy about intuitionism in ethics. There are some epistemological things to be said about claims to immediate insight, and the whole problem of fallibility to be met. Professor Hodgson attempts nothing of this, and I am not quite clear whether this is because he does not see the need or because he does not seriously wish to take up a position in which it arises. My suspicion is that, faced with the difficulties of the claim he endorses to a unique revelation, he does make concessions to a form of belief in special revelation which is not quite in accord with the rest of his book.

His immediate procedure, after insisting that the divine events of revelation include the inspiring of certain men to see them, somewhat diverts attention from the main issue. For the drift of what is said in the crucial chapter on the Eye of Faith is the general insistence that we need not despair of "making progress towards a clearer apprehension of the objective truth about things" when we note the need for "revision by fresh study of fresh evidence" (p. 96) or the way each of us is conditioned by his outlook. This is indeed important and a most proper topic to engage the attention of a Gifford lecturer to-day. For many are daunted, in respect of science and ethics as well as religion, by thought of these subjective factors in our search for truth, and it is not at all uncommon to find the belief that there is an objective truth to be known, and that we can have reasonable confidence in having attained it in some respects, repudiated altogether and very rashly, in favour of an ultimate relativism by

those who are impressed by the variability and fallibility of human opinion. Professor Hodgson has many wise and timely things to say here; for example, that our "being conditioned by what is already in our minds" "does not destroy our belief that there is something there to be seen, and that by perseverance in making and comparing observations we can learn to discount misleading prejudices and acquire helpful presuppositions which will increase our capacity to see straight and grasp the true nature of the object" (p. 98). "The trained physician is more likely to make an accurate diagnosis. But there is no absolute guarantee that in every case he will do so" (p. 98). We must have "faith that by the use of our reason, if we honestly seek to discount our personal prejudices and discuss with one another what we think we see, we shall be able to pass beyond an existentialist limitation to our private worlds to share in the knowledge of a common reality" (p. 99). This is well said, and it is equally apposite to stress the "good eyesight" of some, the flashes of insight, and that in all fields there are "some men more gifted than others" whom we may learn to follow. But none of this relieves us of other epistemological problems, such as that of the way our insights are in fact guaranteed in the cases where they seem to be so and in particular what is the nature of the special divine inspiration claimed in religion. If this differs from other inspiration, how *precisely* does it do so?

This brings me to Professor Hodgson's further view, namely that in philosophy and religion, as in all other departments of thought, our aim should be to deal with the relevant material by "asking how it all fits together to make sense" (p. 104). The principle to which we are eventually driven is that we must look for an ultimate explanation of the universe "in terms of divine purpose". This is what the idea of creation means. That is far removed from "the idealist metaphysic", for we are not to attempt to construct a system which shall include both God and the universe as parts of a completely intelligible whole. We are to look for God's own revelation of his purpose by considering those features of the world which illustrate and confirm our "postulate" or "faith" that it has been given "the mode of reality which that purpose requires" (p. 136)—a very different matter, it is stressed, from trying to comprehend and explain God. In accordance with this aim, problems of space and time, sin and freedom and evil are reviewed, it being contended, as a "central thesis in these lectures", "that to see the will to create genuinely free finite persons as the determining factor in our understanding of God's creative activity is the master clue to making sense of the whole" (p. 183). "Conditioning by space and time", for example, is a "device which has secured the individualizing of persons when they shall come into existence as self-conscious subjects of bodily experience" (p. 161). Likewise, both a causal order and "a realm of contingency" are needed for the exercise of freedom, and it is in the perfected freedom of character "formed by the exercise of choice in a field of contingencies" (p. 183) that we find the master clue through which the universe is seen to "express the will of One who in Himself and in

His creatives purpose as a whole satisfies our canons of self-authenticating goodness" (p. 183).

The emphasis on freedom is central here and it is certainly very welcome; one finds it extremely refreshing to see the topic made a central thesis again in a major theological work. In the insistence that genuine choice is essential for the perfecting of character, in the stress on the importance of this for education and in the exhibition of the discipline which is also involved, in the presentation of "individualized free persons" as essentially living in a community "united in harmonious co-operation towards a common end" (p. 185), Professor Hodgson seems to me altogether on the right road. He is stressing matters most vital for a sound understanding of religion. But in the details of what he says on these themes I again find some difficulties.

The main one springs from the twofold conception of freedom which the author seems to entertain. On the one hand we have the freedom of unimpeded activity, not far removed, as Professor Hodgson, is aware, from the "self-determination" of the idealists, and, on the other, the contingency and choice by which the former freedom, our freedom "as saints", is attained. The point on which I am not altogether clear is how far Professor Hodgson has the courage of his conviction here. When he speaks of our being "slaves of our passions or bound by the chains of our sins" (p. 176), he does not much encourage us to regard the contingency of which he speaks as a really ultimate one. One would like at least (perhaps in the next volume?) to be reassured on this point and have a more specific indication of the writer's position vis-à-vis various interpretations of choice and responsibility. The close affinity of these topics with the sense of obligation and guilt also calls for discussion here.

Professor Hodgson has of course treated of these and kindred themes before, but it would be good to have, from a leading theologian with such an obvious concern for freedom, a clearer statement than is yet available of where he stands in relation to the sort of indeterminism which Broad,[1] Campbell,[2] Carritt,[3] Mabbott,[4] Maclagan,[5] Hardie[6] and others have recently held to be presupposed by moral obligation—and of the place of this in the religious scheme he commends.

I have misgivings also about the extent to which the presentation of Space and Time as conditions for "the individualizing of persons as self-conscious subjects of bodily experience" helps to take the sting out of the difficulties about Space and Time usually felt by philosophers, the problem of beginning and end, for example. Professor Hodgson seems to suggest that we encounter these difficulties by misconceiving our task which should be to understand Space and

[1] *Determinism, Indeterminism and Libertarianism.*
[2] *Scepticism and Construction,* chaps. 4 and 5.
[3] *The Theory of Morals,* chap 15.
[4] *Contemporary British Philosophy* (Ed. H. D. Lewis), chap. 13.
[5] *Proceedings of Aristotelian Society,* Supplementary Volume XXV.
[6] "My own Free Will", *Philosophy,* January 1957.

Time "in terms of their adequacy for the fulfilment of God's creative purpose" (p. 159). But however important the latter task may be (and Professor Hodgson is at his most suggestive in the use he makes here of duration in artistic activity), it seems to leave largely unaffected the traditional difficulties about time and space, and I for one find this closely bound up with the main difficulty which presents itself at every point in Professor Hodgson's undertaking.

This concerns the way the mystery and transcendence of God must be understood, and the place of those notions in our view of God's disclosure of his purpose to us. Respect for the sort of antinomies we find in our thoughts about Space and Time is not unconnected with our apprehension of the irreducible mystery in which all finite being is rooted. And I doubt whether we can at all see the world as the scene for the operation of a divine purpose, or place in due perspective the considerable limitations of our apprehension of that purpose, unless we have insights into the dependence of the world on God not derived from any particular features of the course of events, even the most elevated. I do not agree at all that "the doctrine of creation takes for its analogy the human experience of making things" (p. 134), and I do not believe that "to take the idea of creation seriously is to treat the world of personal relations as ultimately more real than that of impersonal forces" (p. 148). I do not know quite what "more real" means here, but even if we can arrive eventually at this conclusion about personal relations, it is not here or in any similar analogy of human experience or postulate of it that the essence of the notion of creation is found, but in some more ultimate and irreducible dependence of all on God.

And here we may return to the themes with which we began, by asking how the attempt to make sense of the universe in terms of a purpose to create free individuals is related to the notion of God's inspiring of men to apprehend his purpose. Most of what Professor Hodgson says about freedom and personality could be said without any particular reference to religion. A secular educationalist or social reformer could go most of the way with him. And if we need to go further to view the process of development from inorganic matter to human life and the attainment of perfected free personalities as the alleged fulfilment of a divine purpose, what sort of inspirations do we need here? Do they differ radically from the "flashes of insight" which the historian and philosopher also require? If we say "No" we come perilously near to deism; if "Yes", must there not be some peculiarity of religious inspiration (closely linked though it is with normal human insight) other than the inclusion within the content of revelation of our being inspired to apprehend it?

Not that we should doubt at all that the inclusion of special insights into God's purpose is a very vital part of the way that purpose comes to be fulfilled and known. And I think we are especially indebted to Professor Hodgson for the prominence he has given to this particular point. It brings us, in my view, very close to the heart of the problem of revelation. And it is for that reason, in particular, that I have discussed Professor Hodgson's view at greater length than

is normal in a review. I do not see how we can go forward effectively from the point to which he takes us unless we effect a very different sort of fusion of his two main themes from the one he provides and remove the oscillations and uncertainties, for such they seem to me to be, in his own way of linking the two.

The ingredients of a sound view of religion seem to be just the ones Professor Hodgson provides—the centrality of our activity as free moral agents; the insistence on the place of right action in the attainment of truth; the integration of spiritual truth into the normal functioning of human aptitudes and the fallibility which ensues; the sense of a distinctive form which such integration assumes in a developing process of revelation; the complexities of religious life; the repudiation of blind acceptance of image, dogma or book, and the admission of the subsidiary but highly important place of scholarly understanding; the challenge to think and speak "as men of our own age and culture" and to acknowledge God as the Living Lord of to-day and to-morrow—these are certainly the right ingredients, and they are put very appetizingly before us. But something is lacking which would enable us to mix the ingredients differently, something which must, I think, be sought by looking again at the process of divine inspiration in the individual without lapsing into the usual obscurities of "the two-sources theory".

Whether this can be done without taking something from that theory is a question I will not attempt to answer here, there being, happily, no obligation upon a reviewer to put out wares of his own. It may appear churlish, where so many pointers in the right direction have been provided in this book, to have dwelt mainly on difficulties. But Professor Hodgson is only half-way through his course, and as he promises to give in the second volume a more detailed exemplification of the theses of the first, it may not be unhelpful to know which are the points at which some of the readers of the first volume are apt to stumble.

I should like to add that the penultimate chapter—on Evil—is extremely good. It provides a helpful analysis of the problem, shows how the worst forms of it arise out of non-moral evil, and steers a careful course between facile rationalizations of evil and the despondency which refuses to subject it to Christian comment. This chapter may well come to be regarded as a standard discussion of its subject.

H. D. Lewis.

Against Cruelty to Animals

I. In 1786 the Rev. Thomas Jenyns-Smith was appointed a Fellow of Dulwich College. In 1823 he added a codicil to his will. By this he left a sum of money to be held in trust by his executors and the Master of Dulwich College to pay for a sermon against cruelty to animals to be preached by a beneficed clergyman of the Church of

England from time to time on a Sabbath day, either in the church of St Giles, Camberwell, or in the church of St George, Camberwell (which had been opened that year), after due notice had been given. He also left twenty shillings to the beadles of those churches to encourage them to distribute such notices. His will was proved in the Prerogative Court of Canterbury on 23 June 1830.

Presumably his wishes were carried out and both preachers and beadles received their rewards. But no dividends were claimed from 1858 to 1868 and the slender income was devoted to reducing the burden of the National Debt. After 1868 it seems that the humble dividends escaped this fate and were allowed to accumulate. In 1900 the Rev. Frederick Festus Kelly, Vicar of Camberwell from 1880 to 1915 and father of Sir Gerald Kelly, with Mr Whitworth St Cedd, a churchwarden, discovered the charity and applied to the Charity Commissioners to have it put in order. This was done in a scheme dated 1902, under which it has since been administered. The charity provides for an annual sermon against cruelty to animals to be preached by the vicar for the time being of St Giles, Camberwell, or some other clergyman of the Church of England to be nominated by the trustees, in the Church of St Giles in the months of May or June. The trustees are the Vicar, the Vicar's Warden and, this time, the Head Master of Wilson's Grammar School. This is perhaps more appropriate than the Master of Dulwich College fulfilling this function, in as much as the Rev. Edward Wilson (Vicar of Camberwell 1578–1618) desired the head masters of his foundation to be "sound in religion, body and mind, gentle, not hasty or furious, nor of evil example, sober, honest, virtuous and discreet, and of a wise, sociable and loving disposition", whereas when Edward Alleyn founded his school he was "Chief Maister, Ruler and Overseer of all and singular our game of Beares, Bulls, Mastive Dogs and Mastive Bitches". However, the two men were very good friends and often dined together.

II. Now the preacher who is true to the best traditions of Christian preaching and preaches from Holy Scripture is at a distinct disadvantage when called upon to preach a sermon on this subject, for I do not know of a single text in the Bible which deplores, declaims against or forbids cruelty to animals, and I can think of only two which may be construed as enjoining kindness.

When in Ex. 23. 4, 5 and Deut. 22. 1, 4 we read that a man should help his brother's and even his enemy's ass if it has fallen under its burden or his ox if it has gone astray or fallen into a pit, it is plainly the commandment "Thou shalt love thy neighbour as thyself" which is being enjoined and not kindness to animals. They are his neighbour's chattels. When the ass rebuked Balaam (Num. 22. 28) she did not do so for hitting her, but because Balaam had been so stupid as not to realize that she had some very good reason for behaving as she did. The fourth commandment forbids work on the Sabbath for both man and beast (Ex. 20. 10, Deut. 5. 14). This is both that God may be honoured by the whole of his creation and for utilitarian reasons. The Sabbath rest for the beasts may be compared with the septennial rest for the land (Lev. 25. 1–4) It is noticeable that the humane

reason given in Deut. 5. 14 for the commandment is not extended to the animals. When our Lord referred to the ravens which have no store-chamber nor barn yet are fed by our Heavenly Father (Luke 12. 24), or to sparrows which were sold at two for a farthing but which do not fall to the ground without our Heavenly Father's knowledge, he was not wishing to make the point that we should be kind to the birds, but that God is and that we are of much more value than such humble creatures. They are an illustration of the providence of God.

The only two passages which enjoin kindness to animals are Deut. 25. 4, "Thou shalt not muzzle the ox when he treadeth out the corn", and Prov. 12. 10, "A righteous man regardeth the life of his beast, but the tender mercies of the wicked are cruel". St Paul quotes the first of these texts in 1 Cor. 9. 9 as an argument that they who preach the gospel should live by the gospel. He asks the rhetorical question, "Is it for the oxen that God careth or saith he it altogether for our sake?" And he answers, "Yea, for our sake it was written."

Broadly speaking, we may say that the attitude of Holy Scripture is that the wild beasts are instances of the majesty of God's creation and the domesticated ones are for man's use and for the purposes of sacrifice.

III. There are, however, two lines of thought which run through Holy Scripture which we shall do well to consider. They are the unity of all creation and the Messianic Age.

By the unity of all creation is meant particularly the fact that we, with all the other animals, are created beings. Perhaps one of the chief values of "Twenty Questions" and other such games is to remind us that we are part of the animal kingdom. This is a fact which, in the pride of our mechanical inventions and the boasting of our scientific achievements which move us farther and farther away from the other animals, we tend to forget. Not only with regard to God, but with regard to our fellow-creatures, we constantly need to remember our own creatureliness.

The Bible is, of course, quite clear about this from beginning to end. As created beings it is our duty to join with all other created things in giving praise to God in his great glory. This the Psalms do magnificently over and over again:

> "O praise the Lord of heaven; praise him in the height.
> Praise him, all ye angels of his: praise him, all his host."
> "Beasts and all cattle: worms and feathered fowls;
> Kings of the earth and all people: princes and all judges of the world."
> (Ps. 148. 1, 2, 10, 11)

as does that mighty canticle *Benedicite omnia opera.*

But the Bible expresses a much closer unity, or one might say community of feeling, between the life of man and that of the domestic animals. This is expressed in what to us seems the curious practice of putting not only a malefactor's family to death for his crime, but also his sheep and his cattle, as Joshua did to Achan (Josh. 7. 24) and of which we read on other occasions. It is also expressed in the commandment regarding the Sabbath, "In it thou

shalt do no work, thou and thy son and thy daughter, thy manservant and thy maidservant, thy cattle and the stranger that is within thy gates". Perhaps the strangest example of all is in the book of Jonah, where we read that the king of Nineveh decreed that the whole city should repent and that both man and beast should fast and both wear sackcloth (Jonah 3. 7, 8). Animals were even thought of as having some degree of moral responsibility, and if an ox gored a human being to death it was condemned to be stoned to death and its flesh could not be eaten (Ex. 21. 28). That is to say, it was not merely killed; it was executed. This community of man and beast is what Major Hume in his book, *The Status of Animals in the Christian Religion*, calls "neighbourliness".

The messianic age is depicted in the Bible as being a golden age embracing all creation, when even the beasts shall be at peace one with another. The most famous passage is Isaiah 11. 6–9: "And the wolf shall dwell with the lamb, and the leopard shall lie down with the kid; and the calf and the young lion and the fatling together; and a little child shall lead them. And the cow and the bear shall feed; their young ones shall lie down together: and the lion shall eat straw like the ox. And the sucking child shall play on the hole of the asp, and the weaned child shall put his hand on the basilisk's den. They shall not hurt nor destroy in all my holy mountain: for the earth shall be full of the knowledge of the Lord, as the waters cover the sea." The thought occurs elsewhere: "And in that day will I make a covenant for them with the beasts of the field, and with the fowls of the heaven, and with the creeping things of the ground" (Hos. 2. 18); and in the book of Job (5. 23): "For thou shalt be in league with the stones of the field; and the beasts of the field shall be at peace with thee." The idea of a golden age with peace even in the brute creation is also found in pagan literature. In Christian tradition there is the legend that not only was there universal peace on the night of the Nativity, but that the very beasts became vocal, while ox and ass knelt down in adoration at the Saviour's crib.

St Paul plainly considers that the whole of creation shares in the fall of man, but that it has benefited and will benefit by the redemption of man. "For the creation was subject to vanity, not of its own will, but by reason of him who subjected it, in hope that the creation itself shall be delivered from the bondage of corruption into the liberty of the glory of the children of God. For we know that the whole creation groaneth and travaileth in pain together until now" (Rom. 8. 20–22).

The idea that the whole of creation shares in the benefits of man's redemption has always been very prominent in the thought of the Eastern Church and especially with the Russians, while it is a well-attested fact that those first fruits of our redemption, the saints, have frequently been on extremely good terms with animals, both domesticated and wild. We think of St Francis, St Giles, St Columba, St Cuthbert and a host of others.

IV. We human beings occupy a very special place in God's creation. Man is made in the image of God and is the crown of God's

creation. He is intended to have authority over all living things (Gen. 1. 26). Yet man is under the dominion of God and owes him both obedience and worship. The beasts are under our authority and we are under God's. But authority always carries with it responsibility to those over us and for those under us. The ancient feudal system with its graded ranks of society from serf through lord and overlord to king and emperor and pope may be abhorrent to us with our hatred of class distinctions; yet all these ranks were interdependent, and if each had its rights it also had its duties. We can, as it were, see the order of God's creation similarly arranged, from inanimate objects, the rocks and stones and soil and sea, grass and flowers and plants and trees, fishes, reptiles, birds and animals. Then comes man. A little higher, the angels (Ps. 8. 5 cited Heb. 2. 7, yet cp. MRV in each case). At the apex, yet above and beyond all, is God.

It is perfectly true that man is the crown of God's creation, and man has not been slow to realize that fact. Only too often have we exploited nature for our own immediate purposes and to our ultimate harm. Yet man is not the freeholder of this earth, but God. We are but his tenants and, moroever, his tenants at will. We have responsibility for how we treat his property which we inhabit, and our tenancy is, as it were, subject to or conditional upon the undertenancy of the animals. It is possible for us to exploit them. They are in our power. But we are in God's power. Our behaviour to them should correspond, mutatis mutandis, for they are not made in our image as we are in God's, with God's behaviour to us. If we believe in a cruel God and that God is cruel to us, then doubtless we have every right to be cruel to them. If, however, we believe that God is merciful, then we should be merciful towards the animals. We surely learn from Holy Scripture that God's mercy and loving-kindness is part of his perfection, and we are bidden by our Lord to be perfect, even as our Father in heaven is perfect. Wherefore even if we only learn incidentally that God cares for the ravens and the sparrows, we should do the same. To be cruel is natural to man in his fallen state. It is not congruous with his redeemed state, in which he and all creation are brought into a new relationship with God. That is to say, it is not proper for a Christian.

V. There are various practical turns, in addition to theoretical and theological considerations which a preacher can give to his sermon, although they cannot be directly based on Holy Scripture.

The greatest volume of cruelty to animals exists where there is financial gain, and public-spirited individuals should endeavour to acquaint themselves with the horrors of the gin trap and of the export of animals.

Then we must recognize that the lust to kill is strong in many of us, and perhaps we are specially prone to it as a nation. We are reputed by our continental neighbours to say, "It's a nice day, let's go and kill something". This is surely part of our fallen nature. Some of us can recall with loathing the exploits of our unregenerate youth with airgun or rifle. It is surely better to be an animal lover than an animal killer, a bird watcher than a bird murderer.

Much pain is caused to household animals and pets through thoughtlessness and neglect. Adults should realize and children should be taught that they have special responsibilities if they keep animals for their amusement. Children should be allowed to do so only under careful supervision.

Then there is the relief of animal suffering due to accident or sickness which is performed by our animal charities. There is no National Health Service for animals, nor do our animal charities receive any grants from public funds.

Ultimately, our attitude towards animals, like our attitude towards everything else, will depend upon our attitude towards God—to the majesty of his creation and the mercy of his redemption.

FRANK BISHOP.

OUR CONTRIBUTORS

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CORRESPONDENCE

CELIBACY

To the Editor of THEOLOGY.

DEAR SIR,

At first sight one is inclined to say the Principal of Cuddesdon was certainly right to tell the ordinands in his charge that the question of celibacy should be brought out into the open and carefully examined. Right, too, when he adds: "Unless celibacy can be firmly grounded in theology no consideration of expediency, no urgent calls for more unmarried priests to meet desperate needs, will carry much conviction." But a second look uncovers difficulties.

I do not wish to take issue with the Principal's exegesis of several passages in the Gospels or even with the distinction he draws between the "order of creation" and the "order of redemption". But it should at least be noticed that the theological justification presented in the address seems to rest wholly upon this exegesis and this distinction. This can, of course, be called a theological consideration, but it does not add up to a justification "firmly grounded in theology". Nor, for that matter, do I see at all clearly just how such a justification would

proceed. What beliefs about God and facts about man are relevant? What bearing has the actual history of clerical celibacy upon the question? By what criteria is a man to judge his own "calling" in this matter which, for Anglicans, is left to individual discretion? A consideration of all these questions (and more) might or might not lead to conclusions pertinent to any answer "firmly grounded in theology".

In the words of guidance to his men (which take up half of the Principal's address) there are clear indications of how he would set about this task. They call for some comment. With his first point, "Take your time", there can be no quarrel in principle. But just how is it to be applied in particular cases? The "call" to marriage both is and is not something which time and reflection make clearer. (In this it is perhaps not unlike the "call" to Christian faith itself.) To ask a man to justify, logically or theologically, his love for and desire to marry a woman is, possibly, to ask improperly or even meaninglessly. (The reasons he gives may be reasonable enough, but they could never satisfy a questioner who was disposed to doubt them; nor could they ever seem fully adequate to the man himself. And quite rightly so.) "Take your time", by itself, is a counsel which could lead as easily to disaster as to clarity. Should it turn out in practice to be the counsel of a long engagement, then in many cases disaster is the more easy conclusion. What else must be added?

"Look to yourself," says the Principal. Fair enough. But how? How is a man to learn through introspection whether he ought or ought not to marry? What sort of things count? Which have the highest priority, and why? (Compare: "Look to yourself to see whether you are fitted to believe in God.") Just here the Principal asks his ordinands a question which seems to me the most misleading thing in his address. He says, "What kind of person are you? Are you really the sort of person who will be able to love God and a wife without failing either?" *No one* should be able to answer Yes to that. Every husband fails his wife over and over again. Every priest (and every believer) fails God over and over again. We know little of St Peter's domestic life, but it is not unreasonable to suppose that it was not wildly unlike his life with our Lord. The Principal's question is theologically inadmissible. It ought not to be necessary to tell anyone that it is no test of the general advisability of marriage to ask this sort of question. (Compare: "Are you really the sort of person who will never fail God? No? Then don't believe in him.")

The Principal elaborates upon this theme by suggesting that certain aptitudes, e.g. those which might indicate foreign missionary service, could of themselves count against contracting marriage. This may or may not, in particular instances, be the case. But no generalization is very helpful if only because questions of this degree of hypotheticality neither require nor deserve answers.

Finally, the Principal counsels, "Look to the situation." All right. But we are part of the situation. The situations visible to the married and the single are not the same, and it is no use pretending that we can anticipate, by any assessment of the problems of the Church,

how our steps will be directed in the event that we marry. (Compare: "Look at the mess the world is in. Can't you see how much better it would be if you believed in God?") To quote the Principal, ". . . no considerations of expediency, no urgent calls for more unmarried priests to meet desperate needs, will carry much conviction."

I have used the analogy of belief in God or the profession of Christian faith partly to bring out certain features of the Principal's argument which seem faulty. But the use of this analogy may bring out something much more important: it is doubtful whether one ought to think of celibacy versus marriage as a question of competing *vocations*.

And something else. Having seen the question of celibacy brought out into the open we cannot fail to notice a significant thing: it is not a question to be settled by generalized reflection. At some point in time a particular man, ordinand or ordained, may find himself in love and wishing to marry. He also may not. If he does he will have a number of questions to put to himself, some imposed by his self-knowledge, some by the conditions of his work as a clergyman, some by his constitution as a human being, some by his vocation to act as a Christian in every department of his life. How the man resolves these questions will be partly rational or explicable and partly mysterious. There are forces which lie too deep for ordinary introspection or dispassionate argument, but they are not necessarily bad. However he resolves them, his faith in the grace of God will perhaps be more important than anything else. In the end this is the only sustainer. He will not have much time for general reflection about the general question of celibacy versus marriage. There is no particular harm in making a case for celibacy. What is harmful is to demand a kind of justification for *marriage* which is neither necessary nor even possible.

Yours faithfully,
H. E. Root.

Emmanual College,
Cambridge.
6 *March* 1957.

To the Editor of Theology.

Dear Sir,

I would want to quarrel neither with the Principal of Cuddesdon's assertion that "the unmarried state is a true and proper vocation", nor with his relating this vocation to "the pattern of redemption", which, he suggests, is "the pattern of renunciation", especially as later he admits that clerical marriage is also within this same pattern, and that the sacrifice of celibacy is merely different from the sacrifice of clerical marriage. I am glad of a printed challenge to celibacy.

But is it really true that "if the shortage of priests is acute, the shortage of unmarried priests is more acute still"? It is true, as he says, that overseas bishops, hard-pressed incumbents at home,

C.A.C.T.M. memoranda and missionary magazines write to proclaim that we have not got enough of them. But we ought not necessarily to be moved by this pressure if it is, as so often it is, primarily an untheological demand, a mere man-power demand—because, on the surface, a single priest can do more than a married priest. And this is what the Principal's "Look to the situation" can so easily amount to.

But supposing the deepest need, at home and abroad, is for consecrated home life, then should there not be an equal challenge to "sacrificial marriage"? The financial and personal sacrifice of clerical marriage these days can hardly be exaggerated, but the fact is the Englishman more easily accepts and uses the married parish priest.

So often the Church, in the form of bishop, or C.A.C.T.M., or theological college principal, seems really to be saying to a man who has decided on marriage: "Oh dear! I wish you could have kept out of it" (however much lip service there is to the vocation of Christian marriage). And the Principal's "Take your time" has something of this in it. "Escape as long as you can." No one could advocate hasty marriage for priest or layman, and all vocations need time for their testing. But once vocation is clear then it is the Church's duty to give immediate and full encouragement to this vocation and to train the priest and his wife for their ministry.

Bishop Henson's remark that 50 per cent of the married clergy were undone and 50 per cent made by their wives ought never to appear in an article on celibacy. (The analysis of the breakdown figures of single priests is not obtainable.) It can only encourage that fear of marriage which enables some priests to call themselves celibate. It could well appear in a much-needed article on Clerical Marriage, treating such aspects of it as the poverty involved and how to embrace it, the vocation of the priest's wife, the loneliness of the priest's wife, the prayer-life of the priest and his wife, the time-table of the married priest, etc. Who will tackle it?

Yours faithfully,

ERIC JAMES.

TRINITY COLLEGE,
CAMBRIDGE.

EPISCOPACY

To the Editor of THEOLOGY.

DEAR SIR,

You say in your editorial on the Joint Report on *Relations between Anglican and Presbyterian Churches* that "it is possible that Presbyterians will need longer to learn their lessons than Anglicans will to learn theirs". This may well be so for another and more positive reason than the prejudice north of the border against the very name "bishop", which you mention. For perhaps the most remarkable feature of the report is that the changes in our inherited Anglican polity and practice which those on the Presbyterian side of the conversations desire are, for the most part, the very reforms which many Anglicans, and they of no one ecclesiastical colour, most fervently, and quite apart from any question of unity, wish to see. Some

of them are indeed already in many a parish among the ideals governing both liturgical and pastoral practice. We have moved and are moving that way.

But the Presbyterian lack of enthusiasm for our post-medieval episcopacy is also, and increasingly, shared by many Anglicans. Here the report confirms one's belief that, if episcopacy is a gift horse which those who have no bishops, both Presbyterians and others, continue to look in the mouth, this is not only because the animal is commonly offered to them with a pedigree the earliest entries in which they are unable to accept. Not unnaturally they suppose that it is the bishop as the Norman Conquest, the Glorious Revolution, and Bishop Samuel Wilberforce have combined to make him, and not as he might, not least in association with themselves, again become, who is being recommended to them. That their "No, thank you", is politer than that of their forebears means little more than that they are living in the Britain of 1957.

Cannot we be moving in this matter, too, even while we talk? It is indeed significant that it is in the setting of the actual and developing unity which South India provides that a new, and at the same time more primitive, episcopacy is emerging. South India is rediscovering for us what episcopacy really is. We cannot yet provide that setting, but could we not already be in the way of reshaping our system to a pattern liable to prove at once more acceptable to others and more congenial to what we have been learning about the nature of the Church? We ourselves have become aware of a malaise. Many of the symptoms of it are themselves little more than the groans of *laudatores temporis acti*—"By Jove, sir, there were giants when I was a boy"—but they add up to a real need for diagnosis.

It is the ghost of the magnate that haunts the situation. He it is who insists that in the interests of a faded dignity bishops shall continue to be provided with flocks of a size that no man can conceivably shepherd, even though he be assisted by flockless shepherds with sees only less fictitious than if they were *in partibus infidelium*, who are surely the very negation of *episcope*. To give to these last real flocks, for the present perhaps in a subordinate but not in a merely administrative capacity, and to add to their number, may indeed be the most practicable answer to the problem, for the Church of England is too deeply bedded to be radical. Problem it certainly is, and it is the cause of not a few irritations and distrusts, not to speak of parochial self-assertions, that are not attributed to it but are persistently harmful. Sheep cannot be shepherded by visitors, nor mass meetings function as synods, nor one who seldom, if ever, presides over their Eucharist be seen by the faithful in his true relation to them. There is hardly an ill result of this anomalous state of affairs to which R. C. Moberly pointed in the learned, bold, and penetrating sermon, which he preached on the subject at the consecration of Bishop Gore as long ago as 1902,[1] that subsequent circumstances have not enhanced.

[1] Published in *Problems and Principles*.

Two archbishops, or, it might be, half a dozen, could adequately sustain our contribution to great affairs and our position vis-à-vis the nation. Indeed, it may be doubted whether there is normally in our ranks more than that number of clergymen capable of doing so. Nothing then would be lost in reducing a more numerous episcopate to an episcopate. How do matters stand? Not to observe the heroic efforts of many bishops to achieve the impossible would be ungenerous. Not to express a feeling, the result of a variety of sometimes small indications, that the magnate conception of episcopacy is showing something of a revival among us might be to display an undeserved awe towards a dated aberration.

Yours faithfully,
FRANK BENNETT.

MAIDSTONE.

THE PROPOSED LECTIONARY

To the Editor of THEOLOGY.

DEAR SIR,

The Dean of Winchester, in your March issue, has written many of the things that we have thought. It is refreshing to see a scholar of such eminence penning a sentence as, "it is to the Bible itself and its order that we must return"; for we know that here is no obscurantism or fundamentalism, but a resolve that liturgical lections should not be arranged according to scholars' whims or fashions. (Have we heard the last of Dr Waterfield's suggestions in THEOLOGY, May 1949, especially his arrangement to avoid the interruption in the sequence of readings caused by holy days?)

Dr Selwyn's last paragraph—of the making of office books—provokes the thought that there might well be an end of these, in their familiar form. With revisions and rumours of revisions in the air, many of us will hesitate to purchase these costly volumes. We have accustomed ourselves to carrying Bibles—and this is no bad habit. The context of a lesson is often of interest, and at the private recitation of an office may be examined.

A Daily Service Book, consisting of B.C.P. and the complete Bible, including the Apocrypha, would indeed be bulky, but it would be worth it. Economy could be exercised by printing the offices, litany, collects, psalter, etc., alone, for office book purposes. And may not this most used section be bound in the centre—whether it be enclosed within the Bible or printed lections—so that the wear on the binding of the volume may be equally balanced?

Yours faithfully,
BRIAN TAYLOR.

SPALDING GRAMMAR SCHOOL,
LINCOLNSHIRE.

THE MINISTRY OF HEALING

To the Editor of THEOLOGY.

DEAR SIR,

I feel that, in his turn, Dr Waterson has misunderstood my letter which you were so kind as to print in your March issue. My point was to the effect that the theological approach to the subject of healing must be considered in its own right, and not made to fit in with conclusions already reached independently. Dr Waterson seemed to me to be doing that in his original article.

He seems to be doing it again in his letter when he says that he is at a loss to know exactly what is meant by the statement that "Christ showed us plainly that disease has no place in the kingdom of God". Because the idea of the kingdom as a present reality does not seem to fit in with "the trends of medical discovery in the last thirty years" he leaves it out. You cannot, sir, leave the kingdom of God out of a magazine entitled THEOLOGY.

By that statement I meant that where Christ is shown, in the New Testament, exercising the power of his kingdom, disease was conquered. "If I by the finger of God cast out devils, then is the kingdom of God come upon you." It is surely theologically obscurantist to dismiss our Lord's works of healing as "miraculous", and therefore irrelevant. Those works of healing were one aspect of his kingdom in action, and unless we are to abandon any belief that the kingdom is in some sense and to some extent already realized we cannot agree to leave healing, as a theological concept, to that far-off consummation Dr Waterson mentioned in his original article.

Disease will of course, remain a reality until the present world order is radically changed, and the day is no doubt far off when the power of the kingdom shall be absolute and disease itself be destroyed. In the meantime, however, we must not forget that, in so far as men will receive the kingdom, its power can be a very real factor in disturbing that causal connexion which Dr Waterson points out to exist between our disordered ways of life, corporate and individual, and disease.

When he remarks on how inextricably mixed spiritual and psychological problems may be, and how indivisible is the individual, he might almost be reminding the Church that it has a ministry of healing entrusted to it. Yet at the same time he seems loath to see his own words put into theological language.

Yours faithfully,
G. O. NEEDHAM.

WRENBURY VICARAGE,
NANTWICH, CHESHIRE.

[This correspondence is now closed.—ED., THEOLOGY.]

BIBLE-READING IN A BUSY LIFE

To the Editor of THEOLOGY.

DEAR SIR,

In her article "Bible-Reading in a Busy Life" (THEOLOGY, March 1957), Mrs Parker expresses the difficulty busy people find in fulfilling "schemes for reading a bit of ancient history, learning about meanings of the original words used, catching up with the latest discoveries in manuscripts and archaeology".

May I suggest that the notes produced by the Bible Reading Fellowship (Series A) would to a great extent supply what is required in these respects and could be used as a basis for further study, if and when time permitted? They are obtainable from 12 Buckingham Palace Gardens, London, S.W.1.

Yours faithfully,
MARJORIE ROBERTSON (MISS).

R.A.CH.D., HEADQUARTERS,
ALDERSHOT.

"THE NATIONAL CHURCH AND THE SOCIAL ORDER"

To the Editor of THEOLOGY.

DEAR SIR,

I am grateful to Mr Mairet for the care of his reply to my article, his courtesy and his many kind remarks about me. It would be out of place to attempt a detailed reply to his comments, particularly as several of them lead to interesting by-ways. I would just like to say that I am not convinced by his reply, which seems to illustrate very well my main point, that is, the failure to appreciate the discipline of economics as a source of accurate knowledge. This is well shown by his remarks about Keynes, which fail to do justice to his remarkable scientific discoveries and the way this knowledge has altered our economic behaviour. I regret that these brief remarks, as many of the summary comments in my article, must inevitably sound dogmatic and authoritarian.

Yours faithfully,
D. L. MUNBY.

BOOK REVIEWS

ABOUT THE BIBLE. By F. W. Moyle. Geoffrey Bles. 15s.
THE PLAIN MAN LOOKS AT THE BIBLE. By W. Neil. Collins (Fontana Books). 2s. 6d.

These books are spirited and lucid attempts to bring understanding of what the various books of the Bible are about—and what the Bible is not—to the non-specialist who is sufficiently literary to have passed through a grammar or technical school. They should be

especially helpful to teachers, to some of whom they will come as an invigorating sea-breeze.

Both writers consider that "for most people the one-time 'Book of Books' has become the book that remains on the shelf", and that the main reasons therefor are (1) the "because-the-Bible-says-so" views of inspiration which have led to the burning of "witches", the defence of slavery, and the persecutions by South African fundamentalists of "the children of Ham"; and (2) the fact that "the beautiful and impressive language of the Authorized Version" is nowadays often dead. Mr Moyle drives this point home by his comparison (p. 143) of Moffat's translation with the A.V. (so-called) of 2 Cor. 6. 11–13: "O ye Corinthians, our mouth is open unto you, our heart is enlarged. Ye are not straitened in us, but ye are straitened in your own bowels. Now for a recompense in the same (I speak as unto my children), be ye also enlarged."

Mr Neil's book shows signs of having been somewhat hurriedly written. Whereas on p. 126 he justifiably says "one of the most dangerous and misleading phrases we can use is, 'The Bible says' ", five pages later he slips into the phrases "the Bible is asserting" and "the Bible would say to us"; it is reassuring to be told on the next page that "the Bible gives no slick answers".

Yet that (whatever we may think of certain Bible passages in that respect) is what Mr Neil, when writing for the plain man, is almost inevitably tempted to do. Amos is "a simple farm-hand" (p. 52); Elijah, "a man who was himself something of a human tornado"—and is therefore depicted as ascending to heaven in fire (p. 122). It is surely going rather far to say (p. 43) "there is no conflict between the Bible and human science". And one wonders what the plain man will make of YHWH (p. 141) or the Logos. But many plain men will consider this little book a bargain at 2s. 6d.

Mr Moyle's collection of essays, which agrees with Mr Neil in supposing Jonah in the whale to be an allegorical representation of Israel in exile, is more carefully weighed. It is a series of impressionist pictures of some of the most important books, and would make no claim to represent what is nowadays called "biblical theology". Indeed, Mr Moyle is modestly apprehensive that he may be treated like Agag, as he treads delicately upon doubtful ground. But he is always readable and always able to introduce his topics with some fruit of his long ministry in industrial parishes. In further editions he might do well to place Nehemiah, and still more Isaiah 40 ff., before Ezra in his initial table of "approximate dates", and remove the impression that the book of Jeremiah was written by 621. He seems over-confident that St Paul was executed as early as 62–3, and that Philemon (on which he does well to focus attention) was written from Rome. Some further references to the passages alluded to would also add to the value of the book.

H. P. Kingdon.

Chewton Mendip.

GOD IN THE PSALMS. By George S. Gunn. Saint Andrew Press. 21s.

This book is a careful and scholarly study of the theology of the Psalms by an Old Testament scholar, intended for "the (sc. Christian) preacher and general reader". His judgment on such problems as date and composition strike a non-specialist as eminently reasonable and judicious, and he is specially concerned to emphasize the parallelism between the Psalms and the doctrine of the prophets. Hence he passes over the Nature Psalms in a chapter, as concerned only with "the fringes of God's ways", and then takes successively the historical Psalms ("the Divine Control of History") and those which deal with "the Divine Conflict with Evil". It is in this connexion that he discusses the Imprecatory Psalms, facing the question why they were—not written, but—deliberately included in the Temple Hymnbook of public worship. He concludes after some valuable discussion, that they represent a real and necessary element of proper respect for the majestic holiness of God which is flouted by the wicked, even if this is expressed with exaggeration, and in his view impossible of use on the lips of Jesus and his followers. And he finds in the Messianic Psalms the next stage in the recognition of this Divine Conflict with Evil—that it logically involves the assurance of God's ultimate Triumph, and indeed of a personal Triumpher, fulfilled of course in Christ.

Turning to the Psalms of personal religion, which he estimates to include over half the Psalter, he deals in one chapter with the Essentials of Personal Religion displayed in them, and then in its Stresses, specially in regard to sickness, misfortune and the shortness of life. His admirable discussion of the question whether or not the Psalmists ever rise to an assertion of life beyond death (which he concludes they just do attain in a very few passages) poses the problem which is implicit throughout the book. Must not a Christian writer on the Psalms decide whether he is seeking, in a purely scholarly spirit, like Kirkpatrick or Barnes, to assist the reader to discover the origins and original meaning of the Psalms, *or* to expound their substance for the Christian who in public or private worship uses them in his own devotion? In this particular matter, the Christian, knowing the truth of the Resurrection, inevitably interprets the Psalms in the light of that fuller revelation, and the scholar's discussion is irrelevant.

Dr Gunn's closing chapter on Fulfilment in Worship—i.e. the Public Worship of the Second Temple—suffers also from too long an inquiry on the academic level into the relation between Priest and Prophet, and the influence of the "Cult-Prophet", leaving little room for the comment he can give so well.

But, despite such criticism, one reader at least rises from the book much the richer for a fuller understanding of individual Psalms, and of the book whose amazing wealth and beauty Dr Gunn has done much to demonstrate.

HENRY, KNARESBOROUGH.

HARROGATE.

THE GIFT OF CONVERSION. By Erik Routley. Lutterworth Press. 18s. 6d.

Conversion is a term which is frequently used, though the forms which it may take and its consequences are not always fully appreciated. A haze of misunderstanding and mythology tends to hang over the subject. Mr Routley sets out to lift this haze, and to a very large extent succeeds in doing so. If he does not completely succeed it is because he braves difficult questions. The primary biblical meaning of conversion is to stand, turn and attend; not necessarily a once-and-for-all event (cp. Jas. 5. 19). It may well be a return, a turning again, reviving or restoring. For this reason the archetypes of conversion—St Paul, St Augustine and John Wesley—may be misleading, just as much as the "blood-and-thunder" conversions of the post-reformation era are. It is not primarily a moral nor an intellectual acceptance of a given truth. Here Mr Routley's own geometrical experience, fascinating as it is, may be misleading unless a distinction between conversion and inspiration is made clear. Complete conversion is given by God through the Holy Ghost, and results in finding that we are both dead and risen with Jesus Christ in his own death and resurrection; in whom and through whom we become free persons, new beings (2 Cor. 5. 17). Yet are we thereby a new *kind* of being? At this very point a backwash of Calvinism, through his consideration of the *Marrow of Modern Divinity*, leads the author to over-emphasize—to exaggerate—Paul's contrast between "law" and "grace". Paul had special reason for dwelling upon this contrast in Romans; but to-day we see the *torah* in a wider and deeper sense than mere enacted law. To-day, in fact, we perhaps need to lay emphasis upon the continuity of the New with the Old Testament, and the dependence of the former upon the latter. Similarly, there is a continuity and dependence between our unconverted and converted states. Conversion gives us the freedom to be—or to become—what we were destined to be from our beginning. But it is not—save in rare cases—a sudden break. The third movement of Beethoven's violin concerto suddenly breaks out of, and away from, the second. (Mr Routley is musical as well as semi-mathematical.) Conversion breaks out of, but *not away from*, the unconverted life. As O. C. Quick[1] put it, ". . . it is congenial to the Protestant view . . . to teach that the moment of conversion must be clearly marked and not be an imperceptible point merged in an extended line of progress". Mr Routley deals all too briefly with this Catholic-Protestant difference; a longer discussion of it would have been profitable for both sides. Nevertheless, both should read this book from which all can profit.

The absence of consideration of the psychological aspect is probably a good thing; that of any reference to second birth (John 3. 3) is a little surprising.

One slip (p. 72): Lot was Abraham's *nephew*, not his brother.

W. S. BOYCOTT.

EWEN FARM HOUSE,
CIRENCESTER.

[1] *Catholic and Protestant Elements in Christianity*, p. 59.

Le Chrétien Bernanos. By Hans Urs von Balthasar. Translated into French by Maurice de Gandillac. Paris: Editions du Seuil. N.p.

The Diary of a Country Priest. By Georges Bernanos. Collins. 2s. 6d.

Bernanos, who died on 5 July 1948, wrote books not only individual in their vigour and fire but often inspired also by an idiosyncratic religious insight. No praise can be too high for the complete conviction with which in his novels the supernatural asserts itself amid the everyday life of the characters. However, neither the novels nor what we over here call essays but in this instance are the political diatribes are invariable easy reading, even for French people. On the one hand, Bernanos in his temperamental impetuosity was liable to exaggerate. Furthermore, he flaunted an anachronistic sense of honour, and held that the office of the writer, like that of the soldier and the priest, was sacerdotal. In spite of his simple humility and piety, this made many of his interdicts *ex cathedra*. When he sweeps aside in a comprehensive condemnation all the writings of men like Bremond and Claudel he takes us aback, even though some of us may privily applaud. *Sous le Soliel de Satan*, with which in 1926 he at one leap took his place among twentieth-century novelists, naturally brought him admiring letters from strangers. One was from the poet, the Comtesse de Noailles, to whom he replied that he could not reciprocate her admiration, as her volumes of poems had long been among his familiar enemies. He regarded in the same way the work of Rilke, Gide, Valéry and others, who doubtless went to their grave assured that fame was unchallengeable. It is still disconcerting to our spineless English yesmanship how many shams he observed around him, from the literary notorities who did not distinguish between mystery and the mysterious, through the bourgeois hypocrites who volunteered no alleviation for the working class, and the "petits curés progressistes", to the windbags who prated of the virtues of modern democracy over every alternative system of government. On the other hand, words poured from him as in a torrent, and you have at times to be a pretty strong swimmer to keep afloat in his prose. In short, the desirability of exegesis is unmistakable.

The book by Father von Balthasar which now appears in an admirable French translation is unlikely to meet that desirability altogether. For himself the author makes no pretentious claims. He has wished merely to reduce to some kind of order, and he has done so with impressive industry and clarity. He brings out very well what Bernanos felt to be his central perception. It was that the liberty of the human person, which he regarded as the basis of any true civilization and of any authentic religion, is now in growing danger; for man, in being subjected more and more completely to the machine and to social relations, is reducing himself progressively to the status of an animal in the herd. What disturbed Bernanos madly was that, as it seemed to him, professing Christians remain inattentive to this disease of freedom, by which they too are being secretly eaten

away. But if that and many other contentions of Bernanos are made perfectly plain, Father von Balthasar has collected and expounded too much under his three main headings—"The Christian and the Writer", "The Church as a Vital Atmosphere", and "The Man and his Time"—for his book to be a handy guide.

As is proclaimed in the preface, the reader is directed ultimately back to the books themselves, and he will then re-read them with new understanding. The easiest, and perhaps the best artistically, is *The Diary of a Country Priest*. Mrs Pamela Morris's translation of this has now been re-issued as a paper-back—unfortunately on poor paper and in faint print. Bernanos deserves better; Collins can do better.

PETERBOROUGH. MONTGOMERY BELGION.

SHORTER NOTICES

THE PAULINE VIEW OF MAN. By W. David Stacey. Macmillan. 25s.

While much attention has been paid to Pauline anthropology in recent years, it has been dealt with in the wider context of the biblical doctrine of man generally, or of Paulinism as a whole, or in New Testament theologies. Here is the first recent monograph on the subject, presented by a young Methodist minister as a thesis for the Master of Arts degree in the University of Birmingham.

After introductory chapters on Paul's relation to Judaism and to the Hellenistic world, and an historical survey of recent points of view on those relations, the author lays the foundation for his own treatment of Pauline anthropology by surveying the Greek view of man from Homer to the Hellenistic age and the Hebraic view from the Old Testament through the Apocrypha and Pseudepigrapha to Rabbinic Judaism. Then, in the main part of the book, there follows a detailed lexicographical study of all the Pauline anthropological vocabulary: soul, spirit, natural and spiritual, flesh, spirit and flesh, body, conscience and the inward man. The conclusion is that while the basis of Paul's view of man is that of the Old Testament in the Septuagint version, the paramount influence was neither Hebrew nor Jewish, but his religious experience as a Christian. In communicating the insights thus derived, Paul offered, not a unified system, but an extension of the basic Old Testament conception of man with the help of a few Greek concepts and some quite new ideas of his own.

This is a careful and scholarly work. The data are attractively presented and the conclusions persuasively drawn. While perhaps it breaks little new ground, it provides a useful summary and critique of work on the subject from Lüdemann through Pfleiderer to W. D. Davies and Bultmann.

The author suggests (p. 237) that Paul's Christology might be subjected fruitfully to a similar treatment. We hope that is a promise which he is determined to fulfil.

EVANSTON, ILLINOIS. REGINALD H. FULLER.

Some Principles of the Religious Life. From the writings of John Mason Neale. S.P.C.K. 6s. 6d.

Most of the sermons and addresses of J. M. Neale were taken down verbatim and do not make for easy and continuous reading. This little book is a series of extracts of his addresses to the Sisters of St Margaret's, East Grinstead, on the occasion of their centenary. Extracts are even more difficult to read, and none but an enthusiast for this truly remarkable genius of the past century would care to read the book from cover to cover.

J. M. Neale had a wonderful grasp of the principles of the religious life, the more so since he was a pioneer. It is interesting to contrast his treatment with that of Shirley Hughson's *Fundamentals of the Religious State*. The latter is a text-book, the former speaks from the heart.

His use of the Bible is in the best medieval tradition. Even those who have no sympathy with the latter cannot fail to admire his profound knowledge and ingenuity in the application of texts. While he assumes that the sisters will have a wide knowledge of the Scriptures, he remarks that "the one only especially intellectual effort that sisters who are leading a religious life must of necessity make, is the mystical interpretation of the Psalms". For him, as for the Fathers, the whole Bible is Christocentric.

Neale laid a firm foundation for his community, and with it he provided an inspiration that can still be felt in this catena of extracts. The book will not have a wide appeal, but one hopes that it will rouse a new interest in his work as a writer.

Cardiff Docks. Brian M. Oman, O.G.S.

Athenagoras, Embassy for the Christians. The Resurrection of the Dead. Translation and notes by J. H. Crehan, S.J. Tertullian, Treatise against Hermogenes. Translation and notes by J. H. Waszink. Volumes 23 and 24 in the series "Ancient Christian Writers". Longmans. 21s. each.

It is to be noticed that there is a reduction of price in these volumes from the previous 25s. per volume, and a further reduction to 18s. per volume for those who have standing orders for the series. These reductions apparently now apply to the twenty-two volumes of the series already published.

Both the volumes under review reach a high standard as annotated translations. Professor Crehan is unfortunate in having been anticipated by a matter of months by Dr C. C. Richardson's translation of the *Embassy*, which was very ripe for annotation. Professor Crehan had already published his argument for giving credit to Philip of Side's account of Athenagoras. If some will remain unconvinced on this point, and the consequent placing of Athenagoras in the series of catechetical masters at Alexandria, no one is likely to quarrel with the rest of Professor Crehan's excellent introduction to this volume. The translations are good and readable, and the notes

are learned. Both translation and notes leave a feeling that the aim of enabling the reader to grasp and follow the thoughts of Athenagoras is not kept as steadily in view as could be wished. Perhaps that must be expected when the Fathers are viewed in the light of "the living *magisterium* of the Church". No such criticism can be levelled at Professor Waszink's *Tertullian against Hermogenes.* Professor Waszink has just made a new edition of the text of the *Adversus Hermogenem,* published by Spectrum of Utrecht, and his place as a master of the interpretation of Tertullian is assured. It is not surprising if the notes in the volume under review are weighted on the side of questions of text. The less philological reader may find the annotation a little oppressive for this reason, and Professor Waszink admits that he has approached his task from the standpoint of a classical philologist. The result is a volume somewhat out of step with a series of which the step is already a little ragged. On the other hand, scholars who turn their attention to the *Adversus Hermogenem* cannot afford to neglect this twenty-fourth volume of "Ancient Christian Writers".

W. Telfer.

Faversham.

Operation Firm Faith. By H. G. G. Herklots. Hodder and Stoughton. 4s. 6d.

Partnership. By Max Warren. S.C.M. Press. 8s. 6d.

Thinking towards Religion. By Paul Roubiczek. Darwen and Finlayson. 15s.

Canon Herklots has written a practical and wise handbook to the evangelistic enterprise known as Operation Firm Faith. This, as the Bishop of Gloucester puts it in his foreword, "has the winning of children as its aim; but the *problem* it has to face is that of grown-up people". Canon Herklots has little if anything to say that is startlingly new; such is not his aim. With his customary clarity he succeeds in encouraging all our efforts. Beginning with St Pancras, the station and the young martyr, we are led to see why the enhanced standard of material living to-day (good as far as it goes) must be completed by a standard of life which only the church can give.

This standard of life depends on the relationship of each individual to God and to his neighbour. In *Partnership* the prophetic voice of Dr Max Warren sets before us a high doctrine of Christian fellowship. He provides new insights just where we might have thought everything worth saying had been said long ago. His theology of partnership is applicable in many spheres—to marriage, industrial relationships, politics, the ecumenical field and to missions. It is, however, the theological depths discussed in the second chapter which is of major importance. In the N.T. the dependence of the brotherhood of man upon the fatherhood of God is a commonplace. The ideas of being "co-heirs", "partakers" with Christ are the foundation of this theology of partnership. It is not intended as adverse criticism if we venture to ask if these N.T. ideas are not, in their turn, dependent to some extent on something inherent in the

Wisdom Doctrine. The "commandment concerning his neighbour" (Ecclus. 17. 14) is not a regulation, but a further revelation of the whole Creator-creation relationship which is directly applicable to every human encounter. In brief, our thanks are due to a modern prophet for a work which is both theological and practical, and which is far more important than its size might suggest.

Mr Paul Roubiczek's philosophical approach to religious faith is, regrettably, neither an easy book to read nor an argument which is always consistent with itself. Many of his own presuppositions appear to be religious rather than philosophical, e.g. ". . . *for the believer* the Absolute is not empty but God . . ." (p. 167). But what is the Absolute for the unbeliever? A few lines further on: "The philosopher cannot, within philosophy, legitimately claim that there is a God;" if this is wholly true, the book defeats itself. Yet Sir Walter Moberly's essay on "God and the Absolute" in *Foundations* still remains valid philosophy while providing a framework upon which Christian doctrine can rest. Moberly courageously faced the real crux of the matter—the impersonality of the Absolute and the personality of God. The present book fails largely because it avoids this particular issue.

W. S. Boycott.

Ewen Farm House,
Near Cirencester.

BOOKS RECEIVED

(*Mention here neither implies nor precludes subsequent comment.*)

Berean Press: W. G. Baker, *Notes on a Service of Thanksgiving for Childbirth and Dedication of Parents* [for the use of denominations which do not practice infant baptism] (2s.).

Blackfriars Publications: C. J. Emery, *Rosmini on Human Rights* (2s.).

Cambridge University Press: Norman Sykes, *William Wake: Archbishop of Canterbury*, 1657–1737, 2 vols (84s.); C. F. D. Moule, *Colossians and Philemon* (21s.).

Hodder and Stoughton: George Reindorp, *No Common Task* (4s. 6d.).

Longmans: Spencer Leeson, *Christian Education Reviewed* (16s. 6d.); Paul F. Palmer, *Sacraments and Worship* (15s.).

Peter Owen: Derek Stanford (Ed.), *Fénelon's Letters to Men and Women* (21s.).

Religious Education Press: Horton Davies, *Christian Worship* (6s.).

S.C.M. Press: Sir Kenneth G. Grubb, *Co-existence and the Conditions of Peace* (2s.); Lilian E. Cox, *Mirror to To-day* (8s. 6d.); W. Zimmerli and J. Jeremias, *The Servant of God* (10s. 6d.); M. B. Foster, *Mystery and Philosophy* (12s. 6d.); S. Toulmin, R. W. Hepburn and Alasdair Macintyre, *Metaphysical Beliefs* (25s.); Adam Fox, *Plato and the Christians* (21s.); G. W. H. Lampe and K. J. Woollcombe, *Essays on Typology* (7s. 6d.).

S.P.C.K.: George Rowles, *Public Relations for the Parish* (3s. 6d.).

S.P.C.K. (for the Church Historical Society): A. S. Wood, *Thomas Haweis*, 1734–1820 (50s.).

Tyndale Press: F. F. Bruce, *The Teacher of Righteousness in the Qumran Texts* (2s.).

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